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The Diversification Discount Puzzle: 






Prior literature on the diversification discount and the relative efficiency of internal versus 
external capital markets provides decidedly mixed results. We argue that transactions cost 
economics are useful in understanding this puzzle. According to transactions cost economics, 
diversified firms should outperform single-segment firms in industries with higher external 
transaction costs (e.g., emergent industries). Similarly, single-segment firms should outperform 
diversified firms in industries with low external transactions costs and high agency and other 
internal costs (e.g., some mature industries). This paper provides empirical evidence supporting 
these contentions. 
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The Diversification Discount Puzzle: 
Empirical Evidence for a Transactions Cost Resolution 
 
1. Introduction 
There is conflicting evidence regarding the value of diversification, i.e., are diversified 
firms valued more or less than their stand alone counterparts? While some studies show a 
significant diversification discount, others have contended that there is no such discount and that 
prior studies suffer from measurement problems with the discount disappearing when these 
errors are corrected. This study proposes an alternative explanation to this puzzle: we argue that 
the value of diversification depends on segmenting firms based on the balance between 
transactions costs in internal versus external capital markets. 
Capital for investments can be allocated internally by diversified firms or can be 
allocated to undiversified “pure play” firms by external capital markets. We contend that 
diversification can be value enhancing if external capital markets face large transactions costs 
relative to internal costs of allocating capital, and diversification can be value destroying if 
internal allocation costs exceed external financing transactions costs. We find that in “emergent” 
industries, where companies face relatively higher external market transaction costs, diversified 
firms perform better and trade at a premium compared to single-segment firms.  Further, 
underperforming units of diversified firms are more likely to be shut down than underperforming 
single-segment firms in these industries.  In contrast, in “mature” industries, where companies 
face relatively higher internal transactions costs but low external transactions costs, diversified 
firm perform worse and trade at a discount compared to single-segment firms.  These findings 
are consistent with the transactions cost theory. Our findings imply that future studies of the 
diversification discount should segment firms based on the balance between internal versus   3
external transactions costs; otherwise firms with a positive diversification effect will offset firms 
with a negative effect confounding the net results with the net diversification affect depending on 
the sample distribution. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a very brief review of transactions costs 
economics and firm boundaries; Section 3 describes the research design and data used, Sections 
4 and 5 present empirical results and discuss the robustness of these results, respectively.   
Finally, Section 6 offers conclusions. 
 
2. Diversification, transactions costs, and firm boundaries 
2.1. The diversification value controversy 
Many studies have examined the effect of diversification on firm value, finding a 
diversification discount (e.g., Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; and Burch and 
Nanda, 2003).  In response to these findings, two strands of research emerge.   
One strand tries to identify the costs and benefits of internal versus external markets. 
Some authors have noted the managerial incentive problems in the efficient allocation of capital. 
For example, Jensen (1991) and Holmstrom and Costa (1986) explain that due to information 
costs and managerial incentives (that differ from shareholder incentives), optimal internal control 
systems in firms are imperfect and may lead to varying degrees of internal capital mis-allocation. 
Ozbas (2005) notes that, in diversified firms, managers may have the incentive to exaggerate the 
payoffs of their projects to obtain funding, reducing allocational efficiency. Other studies argue 
that agency and other costs of internal capital allocation will lead to resource mis-allocation and 
subsidization of poor investments in internal markets and such firms will suffer from a 
diversification discount (e.g. Lang and Stulz, 1994; Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000).  
   4
On the other hand, some studies have identified advantages of internal markets over 
external markets.  The advantages are related to the information advantage and control rights. In 
other words, segment managers are less likely to be able to hide embarrassing facts from their 
supervisors as easily as they can from outside shareholders, and internal capital markets can 
better keep sensitive data away from competitors.  Matsusaka and Nanda (2002) develop a model 
that shows that while using internal markets to allocate capital has an option value of avoiding 
the deadweight costs of using external capital markets, doing so also raises the costs of 
managerial overinvestment.  In their model, this tradeoff between overinvestment costs and the 
deadweight costs of external markets determines if there is a diversification premia or discount. 
They further show that differences in control rights between internal and external providers of 
capital can also lead to diversification discounts or premia (corporate management in a 
diversified firm can terminate non-performing projects more efficiently than managers of single-
segment firms). Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein (1994) makes a similar argument in favor of 
internal markets. (These models apply to both vertically and horizontally diversified firms.) 
Diversified firms can also be more valuable because they can share valuable non-tradable 
resources and because of economies of scope and market power (Teece,1982; Tirole,1995; 
Williamson, 1998). Based on reported standard deviations of the diversification discount/premia, 
prior empirical work seems to indicate that between a third and forty percent of diversified firms 
trade at a premium compared to their stand alone counterparts (e.g., Lang and Stulz,1994; Berger 
and Ofek, 1995; Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000).  Indeed, this literature concludes that 
diversification seems to create value and that internal capital markets may be efficient (e.g., 
Schipper and Thompson, 1983; Matsusaka, 1993; Servaes,1996; Hubbard and Palia,1999; Klein, 
2001; Khanna and Tice, 2001; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002; Villalonga, 2004).    5
In contrast, the second strand of research in response to the empirical regularity of 
diversification discount tries to identify the methodological problem in these studies, namely, 
whether it is diversification that causes value discount, or it is poor performance that causes 
firms to diversify. For example, Campa and Kedia (2002), and Villalonga (2004) argue that the 
diversification discount seems to disappear when corrections for selection bias are applied.  
This paper belongs to the first strand of research and we use transactions costs theory to 
resolve the controversy in the finance literature regarding the positive or negative impact of 
diversification. 
2.2. Transactions costs and firm boundaries 
Transactions cost economics (TCE) focuses on the notion that when the transactions costs 
of market exchange are high, it may be less costly to coordinate production through a formal 
organization than through a market, i.e., it may be cheaper in many cases to use hierarchy to 
reduce contracting problems and costs (Williamson, 1998). Transactions costs involved in 
market exchange arise chiefly from efforts to reduce the uncertainties surrounding contractual 
relationships (Hart, 1995). Such transactions costs depend on a number of factors including 
uncertainty, frequency, and asset specificity.  These factors contribute to the costs associated 
with market exchange, such as search costs, costs of developing and delineating choices and 
options, costs of designing, negotiating, and enforcing market exchange contracts, and costs of 
other economically valuable activities that facilitate economic exchange.  
According to TCE (Coase, 1988; Williamson, 2000), firms should internalize operations 
when external markets are relatively inefficient, i.e., when a firm faces higher transactions costs 
in external compared to internal markets. In other words, a firm is likely to find it optimal to 
internalize operations in businesses that face external market transactions costs that are higher   6
than agency and other internal transactions costs. Thus, according to TCE, the balance between 
internal and external transactions costs determines the boundaries of a firm (Hart, 1995; 
Holmstrom and Roberts,1998).  
Transaction costs may be high for two reasons: difficulty in designing the optimal 
contract because of problems of information asymmetry and the difficulty in implementing the 
contracts because of a lack of control rights.  Therefore, internalization of independent 
organizations is likely to be particularly beneficial in industries where there is a severe problem 
of information asymmetry and where the exercise of control rights in resource shifting is 
especially important.  Emergent high-tech industries fit these descriptions.   
Numerous studies report that firms with much research and development (R&D) tend to 
high information asymmetry (e.g., Aboody and Lev, 2000; Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis, 
2001; Coff and Lee, 2003). The information asymmetry stems from the high degree of 
uncertainty in payoffs from R&D activities (Mansfield, Romeo, Villani, Wagner, and Husic, 
1977; Harhoff, Narin, Scherer, and Vopel,1999) and because many R&D assets are firm-specific 
and hard-to-transfer tangible and intangible assets.   Disclosure about such assets may be limited 
since it is likely to give rise to greater free-rider and externality problems as competitors may be 
able to infer valuable technical knowledge from such disclosures. Further, many intangible assets 
are unrecorded in corporate accounts (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Boone and Raman, 2001). 
Therefore, firms in emergent high-tech industries are difficult for outsiders to evaluate and 
monitor.  In other words, significant difficulties in external monitoring and contracting in the 
high-tech industry raise transactions costs for external providers of capital. 
On the other hand, many projects in high-tech industries are still at the early, exploratory 
stage. Some of these projects will be successful, but most of these projects will fail (e.g.,   7
Mansfield, Romeo, Villani, Wagner, and Husic, 1977; Harhoff, Narin, Scherer, and Vopel,1999) 
Therefore, firms with high R&D spending are associated with higher levels of managerial 
discretion (Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia, 1999) and it is thus important for the owners to 
have the control rights to redeploy poorly-performing assets on a timely basis. However, it is 
difficult for outside shareholders to exercise this control right effectively because of the 
ownership structure in the high-tech industries.  Like other industries, outside ownership is 
generally widely-distributed, which makes coordinated effort difficult to achieve.  In addition, 
unlike firms in other industries, high-tech firms are generally more closely controlled by 
company insiders.  Lorsch, Zelleke and Pick (2001) argue that this structure is deeply flawed 
because insiders have a strong incentive to maximize short-run returns and to engage in cash out 
events, and they will not do anything to sacrifice their own jobs, such as terminating 
unpromising projects and return cash to outside investors.  All of the above creates conflicts of 
interests with outside shareholders.  In contrast, it is much easier for the central management in 
the internal markets to terminate projects with bleak outlook quickly, because the central 
management generally has the entire control rights over a subsidiary.   
As this brief review indicates, high-tech industries suffer from more severe problems of 
information asymmetry and external markets find firms in these emergent industries more 
difficult to monitor.  Further, external markets often do not have the control rights to shift 
resources quickly between different stand alone operating units effectively, which the internal 
markets can do much better.  According to TCE, both these factors tend to raise contractual 
complexities and costs (Kogut and Zander, 1996), thus leading to higher transactions costs in 
external markets for high-tech companies.    8
In contrast, internalization of independent organizations is likely to be particularly costly 
in cases where 1) there is a low level of information asymmetry, and 2) there is little need to shift 
resources between divisions, so the value of the real option to avoid dead-weight external 
financing costs is low, and the agency costs of internal market becomes dominant (Matsusaka 
and Nanda, 2002).  There can be many forms of agency costs when managers seek their own 
goals often to the detriment of shareholders. These agency costs may include empire building, 
managerial entrenchment, and inefficient processing of investment opportunities. Firms in 
mature industries meet these conditions: high free cash flows and fewer investment 
opportunities, little or no R&D and little or no need for external financing. Thus, diversification 
should be costly and value destroying in these industries. 
In summary, we contend that internal capital markets (in spite of their agency cost and 
resource mis-allocation problems) may be more efficient and better equipped to choose 
“winners” in emergent high-tech industries and in such firms we should observe better operating 
performance among segments and a diversification premium. We further contend that the 
opposite is likely to be true for firms in the mature industries where we should observe better 
operating performance among single-segment firms and a diversification discount.
1 To avoid 
confounding results, unlike prior national studies of diversification, this study identifies and 
examines the impact of diversification on the performance and valuation of two separate sets of 
US firms, i.e., firms from emergent versus mature industries with segments in both types of firms 
compared to their matched stand-alone counterparts. 
 
                                                 
1 Similarly, studies of international diversification need to account for differences in transactions costs faced by 
firms in different countries that may have different cultures, values, and institutional structures and differences in the 
efficiency of financial markets. 
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3. Research design and data 
Prior studies of the relative efficiency of internal versus external markets have included a 
wide range of industries obfuscating the empirical results regarding the efficiency of 
diversification. This study avoids this problem by being focused as it examines empirical 
evidence regarding the value of diversification and the relative efficiency of internal versus 
external capital markets for two sets of companies, the first in emergent high-tech industries and 
the second in mature low-tech industries.  
3.1. Data and sample selection 
Firms in the emergent high-tech industries set are required to have high R&D expenses 
(R&D spending greater than 8% of assets - many industries have R&D intensity between 0 and 4 
percent and many are at more than 8 percent, but no industry falls into the range between 5 
percent and 8 percent), higher than median investment opportunities (as reflected in market-to-
book ratios), and higher than median needs for external financing. In contrast, the second set of 
firms come from what is referred here generally as mature industries, industries where there is 
small information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders and relatively little uncertainty in 
investment results. Such firms face relatively low external transactions costs but relatively high 
internal agency and other costs so that they are likely to exhibit value destroying diversification. 
This set of firms are required to have no R&D expenses, low investment opportunities (market-
to-book ratios less than 1), and no need for external financing. Application of these criteria 
results in eight emergent high-tech industries and seventeen mature low-tech industries. The 4-
digit SIC codes for these industries and their characteristics in terms of number of observations, 
R&D expenses, external financing needs, market-to-book ratios, and asset size are summarized 
in table 1.   10
(Please insert Table 1 about here) 
The study period is 1995-2001 as detailed segment data needed for this study are 
unavailable for earlier periods. It should be noted that this study period, 1995-2001, includes an 
extraordinary boom in technology investments and this period provides a relatively large sample 
of high-tech single-segment firms and diversified firm segments that are available for study. In 
addition, during these years the investing public was extremely enthusiastic about the potential 
for technology to transform business and society. During the late 1990s, equity markets attached 
unprecedented valuations especially to high tech companies. In this period, high-tech companies 
even with no record of revenue streams and with little or no profits for the foreseeable future 
were brought public. High-tech start-up firms were able to obtain funding in spite of the 
problems of operating losses and severe information asymmetries. In many such cases, relatively 
efficient staged-financing and strict scrutiny by venture capitalists were replaced by lump-sum 
IPO financing and relatively remote control by the investing public. Thus, it is possible that in 
this environment, external capital markets were not very efficient especially when it came to 
high-tech firms. However, this high-tech boom ended by the end of 1999 and the period 2000-
2001 is characterized by a sharply declining market especially among high-tech firms and it 
would be useful to examine if the conclusions of this study hold up in both the pre- and post-
1999 sub-periods. 
As the summary data in Table 1 show, among the emergent industries, R&D expenses 
range from 8.23 to 22.65% of assets while it is zero for the mature industries. Similarly, among 
the emergent industries, external financing needs range from 4.42 to 74.52% of assets (all 
positive) while it ranges from -0.70% to -6.97% (all negative) for the mature industries.
2 The 
                                                 
2 Financing deficit summarizes the gap between internal funds generated from operation and investment activities 
and the amount needed to finance capital expenditure, dividend payout, and other business activities.  In terms of   11
market to book ratios range from 1.58 to 2.97 for the emergent industries and for the mature 
industries they range between 0.69 and 0.97. Clearly, while there are more firms in the emergent 
industries group, the two groups of industries have very different characteristics. (To control for 
the possibility that our findings are driven by different industry characteristics, rather than 
information asymmetry and control rights, we have examined the sample of just the 
manufacturing firms in both emergent and mature industries, and the results are quite similar.) 
Higher R&D expenses make firms in emergent industries more risky.  However, the 
transaction costs argument is based on information asymmetry rather than uncertainty.  To make 
sure that information asymmetry plays a major role in the relative balance between the benefits 
and costs of internal markets, we also present in Panel C three measures of information 
asymmetry: mean analyst coverage, earnings forecast error, and forecast dispersion based on data 
from the I/B/E/S Detailed History Tape.   
For analyst following we use the mean number of analysts making one-year-ahead 
earnings forecasts in any month of the year for each firm-calendar-year. Analyst earnings 
forecast error is defined as the absolute value of the difference between mean earnings forecasts 
and actual earnings, divided by the absolute value of actual earnings. Dispersion of analyst 
earnings forecast is defined as the standard deviation of earnings forecast scaled by the absolute 
value of the mean earnings forecast.   These measures have been widely used in the prior 
literature as measures of firms’ information environment (e.g. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 
1999;  Kang and Liu, 2004; Gomes and Phillips, 2006). It is clear from this panel that emergent 
                                                                                                                                                             
COMPUSTAT terms, it is defined as the ratio of (data113 - data109 + data128 – data107 + data129 + data127 + 
data236 - data123 - data124 - data125 – data126 - data106 - data123) to data6. 
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high-tech firms are indeed more subject to the problem of information asymmetry: they have 
lower analyst coverage, higher earnings forecast error, and higher earnings forecast dispersion.
3   
We select all firms that operate in the eight emergent and seventeen mature industries 
from the COMPUSTAT Segment NAICS file. We then separate these firms into stand-alone and 
diversified firms. A firm is regarded as a diversified firm if it has one or more segments 
operating outside the eight high-tech industries in the case of emergent industries and outside the 
seventeen low-tech industries in the case of the mature industries.  Otherwise, firms in these 
eight and seventeen industries respectively are regarded as single-segment firms. However, if a 
firm operates in more than one high-tech industry in this study, for example, both software 
publishing and business support services, we classify it as a stand-alone. There are very few 
firms operating in more than one high tech segment. Excluding these firms from the analysis 
does not change the results. Further, although in principle, a firm could have a segment in both 
an emergent and a mature industry, no such conglomerate exists 
Segment data are available from the COMPUSTAT Business Information File, which 
contains seven years of information for operating segments of every company. This is a revised 
Business Information File following the reporting changes required under SFAS 131 (issued in 
June 1997 and effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1997). SFAS 131 requires 
a public corporation to report financial information about its operating segments. An operating 
segment is defined as “an enterprise about which separate financial information is available that 
                                                 
3 It is difficult to measure agency costs because agency problems are multi-dimensional.  The corporate governance 
literature has made an effort to examine aspects of agency problems, but this literature has shown that one (or a few) 
governance measure cannot capture the overall agency problem, and that although some governance mechanisms are 
complimentary, some are supplementary (Gillan, Hartzell, and Starks, 2006).  For this reason, we choose not to 
include governance measures in this study. Lack of control for agency costs may induce the endogeneity problem 
and results may be affected.   13
is evaluated regularly by the chief operating decision maker in deciding how to  allocate 
resources and in assessing performance.”
4  
SFAS 131 also requires “reconciliation of total segment revenues, total segment profit or 
loss, total segment assets, and other amounts disclosed for segments to corresponding amounts in 
the enterprise's general-purpose financial statements.” As the data in our sample are reported in 
accordance with SFAS 131, we expect no discrepancy between data at segment and firm levels. 
For 1995 and 1996 data, while we omit observations where the aggregate segment data deviates 
from the firm-level data by more than 10%, if there is a smaller discrepancy between data at 
segment and firm levels, we follow the convention of previous studies and allocate any 
discrepancy to each segment in proportion to their asset size. 
3.2. Statistical analysis 
3.2.1 Summary statistics  
Since the size distribution between diversified firm segments and single-segment firms 
differs, we adopt a matching method. In order to control for industry and size, for each segment-
year observation, we find a stand-alone firm-year observation that shares the same 4-digit 
NAICS code and has the closest asset size match (we report matching quality in Table 4). Since 
the distribution of many variables differs from the normal distribution and means for accounting 
ratios may be contaminated by outliers, we use non-parametric procedures comparing medians 
with the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. As neither market values nor replacement costs are 
available for segments, this study can not calculate or use Tobin’s Q. Therefore, we follow 
Berger and Ofek (1995) and use accounting variables reported at the segment level and compare 
them with firm-level accounting variables for single-segment firms. It is important to note here 
                                                 
4 This requirement of SFAS 131 is particularly important for this study. Since fiscal years that ended after December 
15, 1977, SFAS 14 has required only that some data be reported for segments that exceed 10% of total sales (with no 
requirement for overall reconciliation or other details).   14
that only limited data is available for segments of multidivisional firms - only five accounting 
variables are reported at the segment level: asset size, sales, capital expenditure, operating 
profits, and depreciation.   
Differences in operating efficiency and profitability are assessed using differences in 
asset turnover ratios and operating profitability (return on assets and profit margin on sales). An 
advantage of using operating efficiency is that it avoids possible problems with profitability 
measures - diversified firms may intentionally allocate more fixed-costs or overhead to low-tech 
segments so that high-tech segments appear artificially more profitable. Since sales and assets 
are not as easy to mis-allocate across segments, results using asset turnover ratios are less likely 
to be contaminated.
5 Finally, we compare the observed market-to-book ratios for diversified 
firms with imputed market-to-book ratios for the same firms. We apply the same matching 
method to the segments operating in other industries in these diversified firms to find their stand-
alone matches. The imputed market-to-book ratios are the average market-to-book ratio of a 
diversified firm with the market-to-book ratio of each segment imputed the same market-to-book 
ratio as its matched single-segment counterpart weighted by the asset proportion of each 
segment. 
3.3.2 Multivariate analysis  
Various measures of operating efficiency (asset turnover), and profitability (return on 
assets) are examined as to how they differ between single-segment firms and diversified firm 
segments. Regressions are estimated for these variables as dependent variables. The list of 
independent variables used in these regressions reflects the limited data available for segments; 
and include a dummy 0,1 variable signifying a segment versus a stand-alone status (1 if a 
                                                 
5 While it is possible that managers may manipulate financial reports, accounting literature shows that disclosure is 
generally reliable in equilibrium even though it may have some bias (see Dye, 1988; Fischer and Verrecchia, 2000).   15
segment, 0 if a single-segment firm), and other available variables that reflect business 
characteristics such as size, lagged investment ratio, and depreciation. In order to account for 
industry differences, the industry median of the dependent variable is also used as an 
independent variable.     
Many of the variables in this study are ratios and are characterized by the presence of 
many outliers. In addition, many variables have highly skewed distributions. In order to 
minimize the problems associated with the presence of outliers in multivariate ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regressions, we use quantile regression procedures (e.g., Kroenker and Bassett, 
1978; Mata and Machado, 1996; and Kroenker and Hallock, 2001). Quantile regression 
minimizes the absolute deviations instead of the sum of squared residuals in traditional OLS 
regression and the regression results are relatively robust to departures from normality.  
Define q as the quantile to be estimated; the median is q = 0.5. For each observation i, let 
i r be the residual  
∑ − =
j
ij j i i x y r β  
Define the multiplier  i h  
. ) 1 ( 2 0 2 otherwise q and r if q h i i − > =  
Then the quantity being minimized with respect to  i β is  i
i
i h r ∑ . To cope with heterogeneity, 
this paper uses a bootstrapped estimate of the entire variance-covariance matrix of the estimators 
that is introduced by Gould (1992, 1997) and embedded in Stata, to estimate standard errors.
  
3.3. Sample characteristics 
  The descriptive statistics of diversified firm segments and single-segment firms during 
our sample period are reported in Table 2. Diversified firm segments in these diversified firms   16
are compared to their stand-alone peers. Diversified firm segments and single-segment firms in 
high-tech industries are presented in Panel A, while those in the mature industries are reported in 
Panel B. In total, there are 3,568 and 8,488 diversified firm segments and single-segment firms 
in high-tech industries, and 1,825 diversified firm segments and 1,697 single-segment firms in 
the mature industries. As the data in Panel A show, there are clear differences in the distribution 
of the sample by industry.  We also find (but do not report because of space limitations) that, for 
the emergent industries, single-segment firms have a larger median asset size but diversified firm 
segments have a larger mean asset size. In terms of sales, diversified firm segments seem 
somewhat larger than single-segment firms. Among mature industries, single-segment firms 
appear to be larger in both sales and assets. Clearly, all of these size distributions for both mature 
and emergent industries are highly skewed. Further analysis should reflect this high degree of 
skewness in the data – using non-parametric techniques and perhaps by separating the analysis 
into size quartiles. 
[Please insert Table 2 about here.] 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Informational efficiency 
This section investigates relative informational efficiency of internal versus external 
capital markets. Because of differences in informational asymmetry and control rights between 
mature and emergent industries, internal capital markets may or may not be better at choosing 
higher-quality projects depending on the balance between internal and external transactions 
costs.
6 In case of emergent industries, internal capital markets may be better able to find and 
                                                 
6 There is no clear reason to believe that operating managers are, on average, more capable in either diversified firm 
segments or single-segment firms. Therefore, we assume that any differences in operating efficiency ratios would 
mainly stem not from operating efficiency, but instead from the quality of the projects chosen.   17
channel funds to more profitable and operationally efficient projects while in mature industries 
internal capital markets are likely to be less efficient than external markets resulting in lower 
operational efficiency for segments of diversified firms. Tables 3 and 4 report the three measures 
of efficiency for diversified firm segments and their matched stand-alone counterparts. Table 3 
reports the results for the emergent industries and Table 4 reports the results for the mature 
industries. 
[Please insert Table 3 about here.] 
[Please insert Table 4 about here.] 
For the emergent industries, diversified firm segments have an unambiguously higher 
asset turnover ratios compared to their single-segment counterparts (and the difference is 
statistically highly significant). Further, segments of diversified firms in emergent high-tech 
industries are more profitable than their single-segment counterparts. In contrast, as shown in 
Table 4 for the mature industries, segments of diversified firms generally have lower asset 
turnover, lower profit margin, and lower return on assets compared to their single-segment 
counterparts. Segments of diversified firms in mature industries are less efficient and less 
profitable than their matched single-segment counterparts. The comparison results presented in 
this table clearly support our transactions costs-based contention regarding the value of 
diversification.  
Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) finds differences in behavior between peripheral and 
main segments.  Therefore, it is important to check if our results are contaminated by differences 
in relative sizes of segments in diversified firms. We measure relative segment size position by 
asset weight, which is segment asset size as a proportion of total firm size.  We break our sample 
into four quartiles; the smallest asset weight quartile is comprised of peripheral segments, while   18
the largest asset weight quartile consists of main segments. We then compare the same efficiency 
and profitability ratios across different asset weight quartiles in Table 5.  The results show that, 
across different asset weight quartiles, diversified firm segments are more efficient and more 
profitable than single-segment firms in the emergent industries and less profitable than single-
segment firms in the mature industries. Therefore, it seems that our results are not driven by 
different behavior between peripheral and main segments.      
[Please insert Table 5 about here.] 
4.2. Multivariate determinants of performance 
  Table 6 presents the results of multivariate quantile regression analysis with the segment 
dummy (diversified firm segments as 1 and single-segment firms as 0) for the overall period, 
1995-2001, and sub-periods, 1995-1997, 1998-1999, 2000-2001. Panels A, B, and C present 
regression results for the asset turnover ratio, profit margin, and return on assets as dependent 
variables respectively. As the regressions in Panel A show, after controlling for other relevant 
variables, diversified firm segments have significantly higher asset turnover ratios for the 
emergent industries but for mature industries the results are mostly not significant for asset 
turnover ratios. As the regressions presented in Panels B and C show, both profit margins and 
return on assets are significantly lower for diversified firm segments in the mature industries and 
significantly higher for diversified firm segments in the emergent industries. Once again, these 
contrasting results strongly and clearly support our transaction costs-based contentions. 
An alternative explanation for the above finding may be differences in life-cycle stages 
between diversified firm segments and single-segment firms in the high-tech industry, as 
Borghesi, Houston, and Naranjo (2007) argue that firm age explains a significant proportion of 
diversification discount. In other words, single-segment firms may be at an earlier stage of their   19
lifecycles compared to diversified firm segments, so it might not be surprising that diversified 
firm segments have better operating performance.  To address this concern, we examine year-by-
year increases in diversified firm segments and single-segment firms.  We find that in the high 
tech industry the proportion of new entrants as single-segment firms does not seem to be higher 
than the proportion of new diversified firm segments. Because of the SFAS rule change, the 
number of diversified firm segments in 1998 is not comparable to that before 1998.  From 1998 
to 2000 (the peak of high-tech bubble), there is an increase of 57% in the number of new high-
tech segments, from 520 to 818. In contrast, there is an increase of 36% in the number of single-
segment firms, from 1,166 to 1,591.  It is thus clear that there are more new entrants to high-tech 
among diversified firm segments.  So this alternative life cycle explanation is not likely to hold.  
[Please insert Table 6 about here.] 
4.3. Likelihood of project termination 
We have argued that a lack of control rights may be one of the reasons why internal 
markets seem to outperform external markets in emergent industries.  This section tries to 
provide empirical evidence in this regard.  Emergent high-tech firms generally raise large 
amounts of equity from IPOs or SEOs, and then sit on the cash for the next few years. During the 
period, outside investors are not able to withdraw financing from the firms even though it may 
later be found that the firms have chosen bad projects. This is highlighted by the “deathwatch” of 
many dot.coms after March 2000, when analysts were estimating when these dot.coms would go 
bankrupt given their monthly “burn rate” and existing financial resources.  On the contrary, high-
tech diversified firm segments can only obtain staged-financing from their head offices and are 
evaluated on a regular basis. The head offices have the power to quickly stop financing if   20
conditions deteriorate.  As a result, it would be interesting to inspect the survival rate for loss-
making diversified firm segments and single-segment firms.   
Our focus here is not the actual survival rate of a diversified firm segment or a single 
segment firm when incurring losses.  Instead, our goal is to investigate whether there is any 
statistical difference in survival rate for loss-making diversified firm segments and single-
segment firms.  We use the semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard model (Cox, 1972) for this 
purpose. This model assumes a linear parametric form for the effects of the explanatory 
variables, but allows an unspecified form for the underlying survival functions.  This model is 
widely used in the analysis of censored survival data to explain the effect of explanatory 
variables on survival times. Specifically, we investigate the model  
x
i i e t H t H
β ) ( ) ( ) ( 0 ) ( =  
where (.) H  is the hazard function, which describes the rate at which a loss-making 
operating unit deceases after duration  ) (i t , given that they last at least until  ) (i t .  ) ( ) ( 0 i t H  is the 
underlying survival function that is unspecified. xis a dummy variable, equal to 0 for single-
segment firms, and to 1 for diversified firm segments.  We test if the estimate of β is 
significantly different from zero.  A β estimate not statistically different from zero suggests that 
diversified firm segments and single-segment firms are equally likely to survive. A positive β 
implies that loss-making diversified firm segments face lower survival rates than single-segment 
firms.  
We only include loss-making diversified firm segments and single-segment firms when 
carrying out this test.  In total, there are 556 loss-making diversified firm segments and 1,237 
loss-making single-segment firms.  Cox proportional hazard model shows that the estimate of β 
is significantly different from zero (β
)
=1.5258, standard error = 0.08177, p-value <0.0001),   21
implying that the survival probability is significantly lower for loss-making diversified firm 
segments.  In comparison, loss-making single-segment firms have more time to perhaps 
ultimately become profitable. These findings are clearly supportive of the contention that internal 
capital markets have a control rights advantage as non-performing projects can be terminated 
relatively quickly by corporate management in a diversified firm as compared to non-performing 
single-segment firms. 
Furthermore, the median first-year ROA is -37.44 percent for these loss-making 
diversified firm segments and -53.88 percent for the single-segment firms.  Consequently, it 
seems that although these diversified firm segments and single-segment firms both start in the 
red, the financial losses of the diversified firm segments are less severe.  Upon exit time or 
censor time, the median ROA is -33.22 percent for diversified firm segments (maximum = 
1078.44 percent, and minimum = -282.64) and -43.77 percent for single-segment firms 
(maximum = 61.78 percent and minimum = -30581.04). This data indicate that the median loss is 
higher for single-segment firms. However, it can be argued that these medians are not very 
relevant since businesses with very negative ROAs are eventually eliminated.  It is more 
important to investigate the diversified firm segments and single-segment firms that are given a 
chance to survive to examine whether internal markets terminate loss-making diversified firm 
segments efficiently. 
Since the survival rate is significantly lower in internal capital markets, if diversified firm 
segments with profit potential are randomly or wrongly eliminated, the percentage of diversified 
firm segments that emerge as profitable in the end should be lower than that of single-segment 
firms.  Nevertheless, we find that 57 diversified firm segments (10.25 percent) turn profitable, 
compared with 110 single-segment firms (8.89 percent); and 23 (4.13 percent) diversified firm   22
segments improve their ROA to more than 20 percent in the end, compared with only 9 (0.73 
percent) single-segment firms.  Therefore, it can be concluded that loss-making diversified firm 
segments are under greater pressure to improve their performance and internal capital markets do 
make the right decision to eliminate those diversified firm segments with unpromising futures 
but retain those with promising futures.  
4.4. Value of diversification 
  Table 7 reports observed versus imputed market valuations for diversified firms in both 
the mature and emergent industries. This table shows that observed valuations for diversified 
firms in mature industries are significantly lower than their imputed valuations – clearly 
indicating a significant diversification discount. In contrast, imputed valuations are significantly 
higher than observed valuations for diversified firms in emergent industries – clearly indicating a 
diversification premium.  
[Please insert Table 7 about here.] 
6. Conclusions 
While internal capital markets have some informational advantages in allocating capital, 
they also have some limitations in the form of agency costs where managers can manipulate the 
process to fund projects that are economically less valuable for shareholders but provide higher 
managerial benefits. Thus, it is fairly widely contended that internal capital markets are generally 
less efficient than external capital markets and there is a significant diversification discount with 
much empirical literature confirming these contentions. However, others disagree, with some 
empirical literature showing that internal capital markets may not be inefficient. Currently, the 
literature is divided and there seems to be controversy regarding the nature and extent of the 
diversification discount. To move the debate forward, based on transactions cost economics, this   23
paper shows that diversification is likely to be value enhancing when external capital markets are 
relatively inefficient (as in the case of emergent high-tech industries), and diversification is likely 
to be value destroying when internal capital markets suffer from agency and other costs that are 
higher relative to costs in external capital markets (as in mature firms).  
The empirical evidence based on the performance of firms in eight emergent high-tech 
industries and eleven mature industries support these transactions costs based contentions. This 
paper shows that diversified firm segments in high-tech industries are more efficient than their 
single-segment counterparts while the reverse is true for mature industries. Compared to imputed 
valuation based on their single-segment counterparts, observed values of diversified high-tech 
firms are higher while observed values are lower for diversified firms in mature industries.  
These results support our contention that the value impact of diversification depends on 
the balance between internal and external transactions costs. These findings help clarify the 
reasons for the mixed evidence on the diversification discount found in prior literature. Future 
research on firm diversification is likely to find it useful to separate firms based on the balance 
between internal versus external transactions costs to avoid confounding and offsetting 
diversification effects.   24
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Table 1: Industry characteristics and sample distribution 
 
We define emergent industries as those whose R&D expense are above 8% of total assets, market-to-book ratio and 
financing needs are above the medians for all industries combined. Total assets are in 1995 constant dollars. We 
require mature industries to have no reported R&D expenses and that they have market-to-book ratio below one and 
negative financing needs. Need for external financing is defined as the ratio of (data113 - data109 + data128 - 
data107 + data129 + data127 + data236 - data123 - data124 - data125 - data126 - data106 - data123) to data6.  
During the period from 1995 to 2001, the median market-to-book ratio is 1.23 and the median deficit is 2.6%, for all 
industries combined.  During this period, 45% of firm years do not report R&D expenses.  For those firms that 
report R&D expenses, the median ratio of R&D (data46) to assets (data6) is 4.9%. This table is based on the primary 
NAICS codes at the firm level and covers the period, 1995-2001.   
Panel A: Emergent industries          














3254: Pharmaceutical and medicine 
manufacturing 3,201  22.65%  50.97%  2.97  39.76 
3341: Computer and equipment manufacturing  1,775  12.70%  11.70%  1.74  52.56 
3342: Communications equipment 
manufacturing 1,573  11.20%  4.42%  1.60  58.87 
3345: Instrument manufacturing  2,223  10.92%  3.23%  1.58  38.10 
5112: Software publishers  3,584 17.28%  23.54%  2.33  53.69 
5141: Information services  1,396  8.23%  74.52%  2.07  51.68 
5415: Computer systems design and services  1,945  9.62%  9.36%  1.67  42.30 
5417: Research and development services 402  20.14%  47.43%  2.62  24.08 
          
Panel B: Mature industries           














2212: Natural gas distribution  452  0  -1.44%  0.85  861.72 
2332: Residential building construction  325  0  -6.97%  0.82  154.65 
3152: Cut and sew apparel manufacturing  475  0  -5.79%  0.96  143.67 
3219: Millwork  155  0  -6.63%  0.97  201.84 
4211:Motor vehicle and parts wholesalers  120  0  -2.77%  0.92  87.28 
4217: Hardware, and plumbing and heating 
equipment and supplies wholesalers  127  0  -0.88%  0.79  99.83 
4218: Machinery and equipment wholesalers  239  0  -2.94%  0.85  132.59 
4229: Misc. non-durable goods wholesalers  108  0  -2.80%  0.94  45.34 
4431: Electronics and appliance stores  139  0  -1.22%  0.83  213.48 
4451: Grocery stores  369  0  -0.70%  0.92  742.22 
4511: Sporting goods, hobby, and musical 
stores  154 0  -2.47%  0.69  155.00 
4521: Department stores  141  0  -3.00%  0.79  1514.39 
4529: Other general merchandise stores 217  0 -3.76%  0.92  645.80 
4811: Scheduled air transportation  282  0  -0.83%  0.82  672.90 
4821: Rail transportation  151  0  -2.85%  0.76  1209.27 
4831: Sea, coastal, and lakes transportation  154  0  -1.48%  0.81  484.75 
4841: General freight trucking 287  0  -4.45%  0.83  157.06 
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industry  difference T-stat 
Mean number of analyst coverage  1.63  2.11  -0.48**  -9.08 
(S.E.) (2.25)  (2.48)     
        
Mean earnings forecast error  27.03  18.98  8.05**  6.26 
(S.E.) (66.67)  (58.29)     
        
Mean earnings forecast dispersion  15.60  9.77  5.83**  8.82 
(S.E.) (38.35)  (28.74)     
 
** indicates significance at the 5% level   32
Table 2:  Diversified firm segments and single-segment firms in emergent and mature industries 
 
We define emergent industries as those whose R&D expense are above 8% of total assets, market-to-book ratio and 
financing needs are above the medians for all industries combined. We require mature industries to have no reported 
R&D expenses and that they have market-to-book ratio below one and negative financing needs. Need for external 
financing is defined as the ratio of (data113 - data109 + data128 - data107 + data129 + data127 + data236 - data123 
- data124 - data125 - data126 - data106 - data123) to data6.  During the period from 1995 to 2001, the median 
market-to-book ratio is 1.23 and the median deficit is 2.6%, for all industries combined.  During this period, 45% of 
firm years do not report R&D expenses.  For those firms that report R&D expenses, the median ratio of R&D 
(data46) to assets (data6) is 4.9%. This table is based on the primary NAICS codes at the firm level.   
 
Panel A: Distribution of diversified firm segments and single-segment firms in emergent 
industries 
        
  Diversified firm segments  Single-segment firms 
4 digit NAICS code  Number   Percentage  Number  Percentage 
3254 401  11.24%  1853  21.83% 
3341 342  9.59%  1053  12.41% 
3342 485  13.59%  868  10.23% 
3345 719  20.15%  1175  13.84% 
5112 431  12.08%  1860  21.91% 
5141 396  11.10%  543  6.40% 
5415 604  16.93%  896  10.56% 
5417 190  5.33%  240  2.83% 
Total 3,568  100%  8488  100.00% 
        
Panel B: Distribution of diversified firm segments and single-segment firms in mature 
industries 
       
  Diversified firm segments  Single-segment firms 
4 digit NAICS Code  Number  Percentage  Number  Percentage 
2212 403  22.08%  73  4.30% 
2332 161  8.82%  95  5.60% 
3152 113  6.19%  268  15.79% 
3219 128  7.01%  56  3.30% 
4211 64  3.51%  46  2.71% 
4217 57  3.12%  57  3.36% 
4218 164  8.99%  111  6.54% 
4229 76  4.16%  49  2.89% 
4431 26  1.42%  75  4.42% 
4451 86  4.71%  158  9.31% 
4511 36  1.97%  85  5.01% 
4521 39  2.14%  63  3.71% 
4529 86  4.71%  114  6.72% 
4811 35  1.92%  172  10.14% 
4821 76  4.16%  47  2.77% 
4831 90  4.93%  72  4.24% 
4841 185  10.14%  156  9.19% 
Total 1,825  100.00%  1697  100.00% 
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Table 3: Comparison of efficiency and profitability of diversified firm segments and single-segment firms in emergent 
industries 
 
This table compares the asset turnover ratio, profit margin and ROA for diversified firm segments and single-segment firms in emergent industries.  These 
industries are chosen according to criteria established in Table 1. A firm is regarded as a diversified firm if it has one or more segments operating outside the 
mature or emergent industries in this study.  Otherwise, it is regarded as a stand-alone.  We omit firm observations where the aggregate segment data deviates 
from the firm-level data by more than 10%. If there is discrepancy between data at segment and firm levels, we follow the convention of previous studies and 
allocate any discrepancy between firm and segment level to each segment in proportion to their segment asset size.  For each segment-year observation, we find a 
firm-year observation which shares the same 4-digit NAICS code and has the closest asset size.  Panel A presents the comparison of efficiency and profitability 
ratios for diversified firm segments and single-segment firms in emergent industries, while Panel B reports those for mature industries.  Panel C reports 
efficiency and profitability ratios for other industry segments and single-segment firms.  Medians and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests are used here. Numbers 
in parentheses are p-values.  
 




















Panel A: By size quartile                 
1st quartile  1.68  1.09  0.59  -17.47%  -103.73% 86.26% -24.90% -100.40% 75.51% 
2nd quartile  1.24  0.82  0.42  -2.10%  -38.21% 36.11% -2.33% -29.00% 26.67% 
3rd  quartile  0.99  0.76  0.23  5.08% -2.80% 7.88% 5.36% -2.53% 7.89% 
4th  quartile  0.98  0.85  0.13  8.55%  11.19% -2.64% 8.29%  10.56% -2.28% 
             
Panel B: By year               
1995 1.19  0.98  0.21  5.42%  5.16%  0.26% 6.32%  6.16%  0.16% 
1996 1.10  0.99  0.11  4.59%  1.85%  2.74% 4.51%  1.38%  3.14% 
1997 1.07  0.93  0.14  4.84%  -0.29%  5.13% 5.50%  -0.36% 5.86% 
1998 1.12  0.98  0.14  3.72%  -6.73%  10.44% 4.10%  -7.35% 11.45% 
1999 1.19  0.82  0.37  2.98%  -11.93%  14.90% 2.96%  -9.89% 12.84% 
2000 1.13  0.75  0.38  -0.55%  -32.27%  31.71% -0.46%  -18.93% 18.47% 
2001 1.10  0.72  0.38  1.71%  -25.69%  27.40% 1.85%  -19.03% 20.88% 
             
Overall 1.13  0.85  0.28  3.05%  -11.53% 14.58% 3.11%  -10.37% 13.47% 
(p-value)        (<.0001)**        (<.0001)**        (<.0001)** 
 
 
** indicates significance at the 5% level.   34
Table 4: Comparison of efficiency and profitability of diversified firm segments and single-segment firms in mature industries 
 
This table compares the asset turnover ratio, profit margin and ROA for diversified firm segments and single-segment firms in mature industries.  These 
industries are chosen according to criteria established in Table 1. A firm is regarded as a diversified firm if it has one or more segments operating outside the 
mature or emergent industries in this study.  Otherwise, it is regarded as a stand-alone.  We omit firm observations where the aggregate segment data deviates 
from the firm-level data by more than 10%. If there is discrepancy between data at segment and firm levels, we follow the convention of previous studies and 
allocate any discrepancy between firm and segment level to each segment in proportion to their segment asset size.  For each segment-year observation, we find a 
firm-year observation which shares the same 4-digit NAICS code and has the closest asset size.  Panel A presents the comparison of efficiency and profitability 
ratios for segments and single-segment firms in emergent industries, while Panel B reports those for mature industries.  Panel C reports efficiency and 
profitability ratios for other industry segments and single-segment firms.  Medians and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests are used here. Numbers in parentheses 
are p-values.   
 
  Asset turnover  Profit margin  ROA 
















Panel A: By size quartile              
1st quartile  1.61  1.68  -0.07  2.80%  4.02%  -1.23%  5.54%  8.62%  -3.09% 
2nd quartile  1.42  1.32  0.11  5.29%  6.96% -1.67%  7.09% 7.01% 0.08% 
3rd quartile  0.96  1.02  -0.06  8.06%  9.26%  -1.20%  7.31%  9.39%  -2.08% 
4th  quartile  0.97  0.91  0.06 8.25% 9.18% -0.92%  8.08% 8.46%  -0.38% 
              
Panel B: By year            
1995 1.20  1.20  -0.01  6.51%  8.19%  -1.68% 7.68%  8.03%  -0.35% 
1996 1.12  1.16  -0.04  6.38%  8.12%  -1.73% 8.23%  8.52%  -0.30% 
1997 1.15  1.09  0.06  6.56%  7.45%  -0.89% 7.80%  8.69%  -0.89% 
1998 1.24  1.38  -0.14  6.68%  8.25%  -1.57% 7.07%  8.32%  -1.26% 
1999 1.26  1.25  0.00  6.45%  7.34%  -0.89% 7.26%  8.93%  -1.67% 
2000 1.34  1.25  0.09  5.44%  7.03%  -1.59% 7.17%  8.23%  -1.06% 
2001 1.34  1.23  0.11  3.39%  6.77%  -3.38% 6.09%  7.68%  -1.59% 
              
Overall 1.26  1.25  0.01  6.11%  7.31% -1.20%  7.29% 8.43% -1.14% 
(p-value)        (0.2918)        (<.0001)**        (0.0002)** 
 
** indicates significance at the 5% level.   35
Table 5: Efficiency and profitability of diversified firm segments and single-segment firms: 
Across different asset weight quartiles  
 
This table compares the efficiency and profitability of diversified firm segments and single-segment firms across 
different asset weight quartiles. The emergent and mature industries are chosen according to criteria established in 
Table 1. A firm is regarded as a diversified firm if it has one or more segments operating outside the mature or 
emergent industries in this study.  Otherwise, it is regarded as a stand-alone.  We omit firm observations where the 
aggregate segment data deviates from the firm-level data by more than 10%. If there is discrepancy between data at 
segment and firm levels, we follow the convention of previous studies and allocate any discrepancy between firm 
and segment level to each segment in proportion to their segment asset size.  For each segment-year observation, we 
find a firm-year observation which shares the same 4-digit NAICS code and has the closest asset size. We calculate 
asset weight as the proportion of the segment asset as total firm asset.  Panel A presents the comparison of efficiency 
ratios for segments and single-segment firms in emergent industries, while Panels B and C reports profitability 
ratios.  Medians and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests are used here. Numbers in parentheses are p-values.   
  Emergent industries    Mature industries 
Panel A: Efficiency (asset turnover ratios) 
Smallest asset 
weight quartile  1.27  1.31  -3.54%    1.98  1.85  0.14 
     (0.66)        (0.20) 
2nd quartile  1.14  0.81  32.71%    1.78  2.25  -0.48 
     (<0.01)**       (<0.01)** 
3rd quartile  0.91  0.78  13.69%    1.34 1.33  0.01 
     (<0.01)**        (0.41) 
Largest asset  
weight quartile  0.90  0.82  8.36%    1.02  0.99  0.02 
     (0.04)**        (0.69) 
 
Panel B: Profitability (profit margin – profit as a percent of sales) 
Smallest asset 
weight quartile  -19.89% -59.79%  39.90%  0.88%  3.10%  -2.23% 
     (<0.01)**        (0.09) 
2nd quartile  -4.12%  -40.77%  36.64%   3.10%  2.64%  0.45% 
     (<0.01)**        (0.87) 
3rd quartile  4.68%  -4.69%  9.36%    4.92%  6.68%  -1.75% 
     (<0.01)**        (<0.01)** 
Largest asset 
weight quartile  8.65%  8.71%  -0.06%    7.87%  8.98%  -1.10% 
     (0.60)        (<0.01)** 
 
Panel C: Profitability (return on assets) 
Smallest asset 
weight quartile  -32.82%  -76.36%  43.54%    2.34%  10.15%  -7.82% 
     (<0.01)**        (0.68) 
2nd quartile  -6.78%  -32.30%  25.53%   5.92%  8.23%  -2.31% 
     (<0.01)**        (0.51) 
3rd quartile  3.11%  -4.19%  7.30%    6.69%  7.57%  -0.89% 
     (<0.01)**        (0.06)* 
Largest asset 
weight quartile  6.66% 9.11%  -2.46%   7.80%  8.53%  -0.73% 
     (0.17)        (<0.01)** 
* indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level.    36
Table 6: Performance Determinants: Quartile regressions by time periods 
 
This table shows results from quartile regressions for three sub-periods and one overall period as there was an accounting rule change in 1997 and the equity 
market changed directions in 2000. The emergent and mature industries are chosen according to criteria established in Table 1. A firm is regarded as a diversified 
firm if it has one or more segments operating outside the mature or emergent industries in this study.  Otherwise, it is regarded as a stand-alone.  We omit firm 
observations where the aggregate segment data deviates from the firm-level data by more than 10%. If there is discrepancy between data at segment and firm 
levels, we follow the convention of previous studies and allocate any discrepancy between firm and segment level to each segment in proportion to their segment 
asset size.  
 
Panel A:  Efficiency (asset turnover ratios) 
 
Emergent industries    Mature industries 
Variables  1995-1997  1998-1999 2000-2001 1995-2001    1995-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 1995-2001 
Segment (dummy)  0.22  0.24 0.33 0.30    0.05 0.05 0.01 0.05 
  (0.04)** (0.04)**  (0.03)**  (0.02)**    (0.03)*  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.02)** 
              
Size (log sales)  0.02  0.03 0.05 0.04    0.03  -0.24%  0.02 0.02 
  (0.72%)** (0.71%)**  (0.42%)**  (0.27%)**    (0.01)** (0.01) (0.01)**  (0.38%)** 
              
Industry median  0.88  1.07 0.75 0.91    1.03 1.01 0.97 1.02 
  (0.09)**  (0.08)** (0.05)** (0.03)**    (0.02)** (0.03)** (0.02)** (0.01)** 
              
Lagged   -0.08  -0.02  -0.51%  -0.70%    -0.09 -0.21 -0.72 -0.10 
investment ratio  (0.03)**  (0.10)  (0.03%)**  (0.02%)**    (0.01)** (0.16) (0.12)**  (0.01)** 
              
Lagged  2.31 3.12  0.48  0.71    -0.93  -0.84  2.55  -0.04 
depreciation  (0.23)**  (0.25)** (0.03)** (0.02)**   (0.50)  (0.39)** (0.24)**  (0.19) 
              
Intercept  -0.11 -0.40 -0.15 -0.22    -0.19 0.03 -0.12 -0.14 
  (0.09)  (0.08)**  (0.05)**  (0.03)**    (0.05)** (0.08) (0.04)**  (0.03)** 
              
Pseudo R2  0.09  0.09 0.11 0.10    0.34 0.30 0.26 0.29 
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Table 6: Performance Determinants: Quantile regressions (continued) 
 
Panel B: Profitability (profit margin – profit as a percent of sales)  
 
Emergent industries    Mature industries 
Variables  1995-1997  1998-1999 2000-2001 1995-2001    1995-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 1995-2001 
Segment (dummy)  0.03  0.08  0.13  0.09   -0.83% -0.67% -0.18% -0.59% 
  (0.01)** (0.02)**  (0.02)**  (0.01)**    (0.40%)** (0.36%)* (0.08%)** (0.25%)** 
              
Size (log sales)  0.05  0.06  0.12  0.07    0.50% 0.40% 0.68%  0.56 
  (0.23%)** (0.37%)**  (0.33%)**  (0.22%)**  (0.10%)** (0.09%)** (0.02%)** (0.06%)** 
              
Industry median  0.19  0.50 1.15 0.80    1.00 1.00 0.95 1.01 
  (0.03)**  (0.04)** (0.03)** (0.02)**    (0.05)** (0.04)** (0.01)** (0.03)** 
              
Lagged  0.06 -0.02  -0.20  -0.19    0.28%  0.55%  0.05  0.27% 
investment ratio  (0.01)** (0.05)  (0.01%)**  (0.02%)**    (0.20%) (1.48)  (0.40%)**  (0.22%)** 
              
Lagged  -1.34  -1.67 -0.34 -0.99    0.02 -0.23 -0.21 -0.20 
depreciation  (0.06)**  (0.13)** (0.01)** (0.02)**   (0.07)  (0.04)** (0.01)** (0.03)** 
              
Intercept  -0.13 -0.27  -0.70  -0.36    -0.02  -0.82%  -0.04 -0.02 
  (0.01)** (0.02)**  (0.02)**  (0.01)**    (0.01)** (0.66%)  (0.14%)**  (0.046%)**
              
Pseudo R2  0.02  0.00 0.00 0.00    0.23 0.20 0.05 0.09 
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Table 6: Performance Determinants: Quantile regressions (continued) 
 
Panel C: Profitability (return on assets)  
 
Emergent industries    Mature industries 
Variables  1995-1997  1998-1999 2000-2001  1995-2001    1995-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 1995-2001 
Segment (dummy)  0.05  0.08  0.12  0.09   -0.46% -0.99% -1.34% -0.81% 
  (0.02)** (0.01)**  (0.02)** (0.01)**    (0.34%) (0.28%)**  (0.37%)**  (0.23%)** 
               
Size (log sales)  0.05  0.06  0.06  0.05   0.86% 0.69% 0.74% 0.77% 
  (0.28%)** (0.20%)**  (0.29%)** (0.18%)**  (0.09%)** (0.07%)** (0.08%)** (0.06%)** 
               
Industry median  0.18  0.14 0.49  0.38    1.49 0.77 0.69 0.95 
  (0.08)**  (0.05)** (0.07)**  (0.04)**   (0.12)** (0.10)** (0.12)** (0.08)** 
               
Lagged  0.04 -0.12  -0.19%  -0.21%   0.43%  0.41%  0.07  0.35% 
investment ratio  (0.01)** (0.03)**  (0.01%)**  (0.01%)**    (0.17%)** (1.12)  (0.02)**  (0.20%)** 
               
Lagged  -2.42  -2.75 -1.98  -1.98    -0.02 -0.31 -0.63 -0.39 
depreciation  (0.09)** (0.07)**  (0.67%)**  (0.59%)**   (0.06)  (0.03)**  (0.03)**  (0.03)** 
               
Intercept  -0.12  -0.17  -0.27  -0.22    -0.08  -0.01 0.47% -0.02 
  (0.02)** (0.01)**  (0.02)** (0.01)**    (0.01)**  (0.01) (0.11%)**  (0.01)** 
               
Pseudo R2  0.14  0.16 0.28  0.23    0.08 0.04 0.03 0.04 
 
* indicates significance at the 10% level, while ** indicates significance at the 5% level.    39
Table 7: Comparison of the observed versus imputed valuations for diversified firms 
 
This table examines the actual versus the imputed market-to-book ratios for diversified firms in mature and emergent industries.  The emergent and mature 
industries are chosen according to criteria established in Table 1. A firm is regarded as a diversified firm if it has one or more segments operating outside the 
mature or emergent industries in this study.  Otherwise, it is regarded as a stand-alone.  We omit firm observations where the aggregate segment data deviates 
from the firm-level data by more than 10%. If there is discrepancy between data at segment and firm levels, we follow the convention of previous studies and 
allocate any discrepancy between firm and segment level to each segment in proportion to their segment asset size.   Market to book ratios are used as proxies for 
market valuation in this table.  To calculate the imputed market-to-book ratio, for each segment, we use the market-to-book ratio of a stand-alone in the same 4-
digit NAICS industry with the closet asset size.  The imputed market-to-book ratio is weighted by segment asset size.  In Panel A, we compare the imputed 
market-to-book ratio versus the actual market-to-book ratio. Medians and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests are used here. Numbers in parentheses are p-values.   
 























1995  0.83 0.94  -11.85%    1.15 1.04  10.99% 
            
1996  0.83 0.94  -12.17%    1.17 1.07  9.43% 
            
1997  0.92 1.07  -13.97%    1.34 1.12  19.77% 
            
1998  0.83 0.98  -14.76%    1.28 1.07  19.54% 
            
1999  0.76 0.93  -17.64%    1.50 1.44  4.73% 
            
2000  0.77 0.85  -9.79%    1.09 1.07  1.67% 
            
2001  0.78 0.88  -11.45%    1.19 0.98  22.27% 
            
Overall  0.81 0.93  -12.41%    1.24 1.10  12.68% 
(p-value)         (<.0001)            (<.0001) 
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